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I. Introduction
On July 9, 2019, the European Court of Human Rights
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Editor, North Carolina Journal of International Law. The author would like to thank her
editor, Laida Alarcon, for her invaluable feedback and support.
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(“ECtHR”) ruled in favor of Valeriya Igorevna Volodina, a
domestic violence victim, in a suit against Russia, awarding her
20,000 euros as well as legal expenses. 1 The ECtHR is a court
created by the European Convention on Human Rights to enforce
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 2 The ECtHR looks to
member-state nations to determine whether these nations have
breached the rights of citizens guaranteed by the Convention. 3 The
ECtHR found in the present case, Volodina v. Russia, that Russia’s
failure to adopt legislative and social policies to safeguard its
citizens against domestic violence resulted in a discriminatory effect
on the nation’s women. 4
In Russia, a woman dies every forty minutes as a result of
domestic violence. 5 In addition, there are 36,000 women who are
beaten daily by their partners 6 and experience brutal attacks,
including being “choked, punched, beaten with wooden sticks and
metal rods, burned intentionally, threatened with various weapons,
sexually assaulted and raped, pushed from balconies and windows,
[and] having their teeth knocked out[.]” 7
Despite this staggering number, Russia lacks legislation
protecting victims of domestic violence. 8 As a signatory of the
1 Volodina v. Russia, App. No. 41261/17, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2019),
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/rus#{%22itemid%22:[%22001194321%22]} [https://perma.cc/7ZNM-458E]. This opinion has not yet been published in
the official reporter.
2 EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., COUNCIL OF EUR., THE ECHR IN 50 QUESTIONS 3 (Feb. 2014),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/50Questions_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D4XS3SE9].
3 Id.; EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., COUNCIL OF EUR., EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 4 (Feb. 2014), https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/questions_
answers_eng.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWJ3-EJ93].
4 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶¶ 132–33.
5 Rebecca Adams, Violence Against Women and International Law: The
Fundamental Right to State Protection from Domestic Violence, 20 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 57,
62 (2007).
6 Id.
7 Yulia Gorbunova, “I Could Kill You and No One Would Stop Me” Weak State
Response to Domestic Violence in Russia, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 25, 2018),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/10/25/i-could-kill-you-and-no-one-would-stopme/weak-state-response-domestic-violence [https://perma.cc/YC9N-TFNU].
8 There is no statute that specifically addresses domestic violence. UGOLOVNYI
KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UK RF] [Criminal Code] arts. 111–116 (Russ.)
[hereinafter RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE]. For a full discussion on the state of the law
regarding domestic violence and the Russian Criminal Code, see infra Part III. See
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United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 9 Russia is obliged to stop violence
against women by both private individuals and the government, 10
but instead, Russia has failed to create systematic safeguards to
protect victims. 11 In fact, Russia has rolled back previous
established avenues of protection by decriminalizing nonaggravated battery offenses in 2016 and re-defining aggravated
battery to exclude domestic violence in 2017. 12 Under this regime,
victims have found neither support nor remedy from the
government. 13 However, with the culmination of Volodina, other
pending cases in the ECtHR, 14 and increased attention to the issue, 15
Russia may be pressured to proactively combat violence against
women. 16
generally Nerses Isajanyan, Russian Federation: Decriminalization of Domestic Violence,
L. LIBR. CONG., (June 2017), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/domestic-violence/russiadecriminalization-domestic-violence.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TQC-8MW8].
9 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(“CEDAW”), Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 (ratified by the Russian Federation Jan.
23, 1981).
10 CEDAW, General Recommendation 19: Violence Against Women, 11th Sess., ¶¶
9, 24 U.N. Doc. A/47/8 [hereinafter CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19] (finding
states must act with “due diligence” to prevent violations of rights or to investigate and
punish acts of violence against women).
11 See Gorbunova, supra note 7.
12 Isajanyan, supra note 8, at 4. For a full description of these legislative changes,
see infra Part III.A.
13 See Andrew Higgins, Russia’s Police Tolerate Domestic Violence. Where Can Its
Victims Turn?, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/world/
europe/russia-domestic-violence-european-court-of-human-rights.html
[https://perma.cc/97QB-X9Z9].
14 Tunikova v. Russia and 3 Other Applications, App. No. 55974/16, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(June 28, 2019), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-194607%22]}
[https://perma.cc/K3U3-TMPJ]. The four other pending cases are Tunikova v. Russia,
Gershman v. Russia, Petrakova v. Russia, and Gracheva v. Russia. Id. For a discussion
on the facts and current status of the four cases, see infra Part V.B.ii.
15 See Gorbunova, supra note 7.
16 Currently, there is a draft bill to help victims of domestic violence. Проект
Закона о Профилактике Семейно-Бытового Насилия [Draft Law on the Prevention of
Domestic Violence], СОВЕ́ Т ФЕДЕРА́ЦИИ ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОБРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ
ФЕДЕРАЦИИ [FED’N COUNCIL OF THE FED. ASSEMBLY OF THE RUSS. FED’N] (Nov. 29, 2019),
http://council.gov.ru/services/discussions/themes/110611/?fbclid=IwAR2eaGXQUrPGm
dRdETlyC_9dEy0ADcXNViHTlyK8KLMavtPLXGA79b6LIY [https://perma.cc/L8TRQKZ6] [hereinafter Draft Law on the Prevention of Domestic Violence]. For a full
discussion on the bill, see infra Part IV.A.
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Part II provides background information on the ECtHR as well
as a history of Volodina v. Russia. Part III analyzes the state of the
law regarding domestic violence in Russia and the lack of
protections for victims. Part IV discusses the prevalence of
domestic violence in the nation and its normalization as a part of life
for the Russian family. Part V examines the implications of
Volodina, including pending legislation and other solutions. Part
VI concludes the piece.
II. Legal Background
A. A History of the European Court of Human Rights
Born from the ashes of World War II, the United Nations was
formed in October of 1945 17 to “save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war,” “to reaffirm faith in fundamental human
rights,” and “to promote social progress and better standards of life
in larger freedom[.]” 18 Among the United Nations’ first actions was
the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”). 19 Adopted on December 10, 1948, and guaranteeing
freedoms such as the “right to life, liberty and security of
person[,]” 20 the UDHR is touted “as a common standard of
achievement[] for all peoples and all nations[.]” 21
Two years later, the Council of Europe, a regional human rights
organization, adopted the European Convention on Human Rights
(“Convention”) which gave effect to the protections named in the
UDHR. 22 Every member-state of the Council of Europe has ratified
17 History of the United Nations, U.N., https://www.un.org/en/sections/history/
history-united-nations/index.html [https://perma.cc/5GCN-QJ65] (last visited June 7,
2020).
18 U.N. Charter Preamble.
19 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 12, 1948).
20 Id. art. 3.
21 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N., https://www.un.org/en/universaldeclaration-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/8AEQ-XBFF] (last visited June 7, 2020); see
also The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH
COMM’R
(“OHCHR”),
https://www.ohchr.org/en/udhr/pages/udhrindex.aspx
[https://perma.cc/F67Q-HWGS] (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) (“Translated into hundreds of
languages and dialects from Abkhaz to Zulu, the UDHR set a world record in 1999 for
being the most translated document in the world. [The Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights’] goal is to share the UDHR with the entire world[.]”).
22 See European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 2,
3, 14, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human
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this treaty, illustrating a promise to uphold its values. 23 Section II
of the Convention created an international judiciary organ, the
European Court of Human Rights, to enforce the UDHR. 24 This
court looks to member-state nations to determine whether fellow
nations have breached their citizens’ rights guaranteed by the
Convention. 25 To have standing in the ECtHR, a petitioner must
have exhausted all domestic remedies 26 and allege a specific
violation of the articles of the Convention. 27 Judgments from the
ECtHR are final, 28 and since its founding in 1959, the ECtHR “has
delivered more than 10,000 judgments regarding alleged violations
of the [Convention].” 29
The ECtHR was created to enforce two important provisions of
the Convention. First, Article 3 guarantees that “[n]o one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.” 30 Second, Article 14 provides that “[t]he enjoyment
of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or
other status.” 31 It is through these articles that Ms. Volodina
Rights]. The Convention is also known as the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Id. “[T]he Council of Europe is the oldest and largest
European organization, unifying 47 member states to promote human rights.” About the
Council of Europe, COUNCIL OF EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/yerevan/the-coe/aboutcoe/overview [https://perma.cc/AM67-LKP9] (last visited June 7, 2020). To prevent
confusion, it is important to distinguish between the Council of Europe, the European
Council, and the European Union. Do Not Get Confused, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/do-not-get-confused
[https://perma.cc/3SYMXPTC] (last visited June 7, 2020) (providing a brief overview of the three organizations).
23 See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 005, COUNCIL. OF EUR.,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/005/
signatures?p_auth=csTxtz7n [https://perma.cc/P3AU-435F] (last updated Jan. 20, 2020).
24 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, arts. 19–51.
25 See EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., supra note 3.
26 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, art. 35.
27 See id. art. 34.
28 Id. art. 44.
29 European
Court of Human Rights, INT’L JUST. RES. CTR.,
https://ijrcenter.org/european-court-of-human-rights/ [https://perma.cc/DD2Q-34J7] (last
visited Jan. 20, 2020).
30 European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 22, art. 3.
31 Id. art. 14.
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brought her case to the ECtHR.
B. Statement of the Case
Ms. Volodina began to date her assailant, S, in November 2014
in the city of Ulyanovsk. 32 After a separation in May 2015, S began
to threaten and abuse, physically and mentally, Volodina for the
next three years. 33 Volodina repeatedly sought protection from
authorities and a haven in the judicial system—each time she was
denied. 34
In January 2016, Volodina reported to authorities that S had
damaged her car’s windscreen. 35 Russian authorities refused to
prosecute S, reasoning that as he had replaced the windshield, no
crime had occurred, and S’s “actions had not constituted any
offence.” 36 That same month, Volodina escaped to Moscow. 37
After publishing her curriculum vitae online, Volodina was
contacted by an alleged human resources manager, D, for an
interview, where D arranged transportation. 38 When D arrived, S
emerged from the back of the car, and took Volodina’s phone and
other items. S forcefully returned Volodina to Ulyanovsk. 39 During
several days of imprisonment, S beat Volodina, resulting in her
hospitalization. 40 After Volodina reported the attack, authorities
refused to initiate proceedings as they had not received a written
complaint from her. 41 In March of 2016, Volodina withdrew her
complaint and police declined to prosecute S, holding no crime had
been committed. 42
That May, S punched and strangled Volodina who again went
to the police, only to be met with yet another refusal to prosecute,

Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 8.
Id. ¶ 9.
34 Id. ¶¶ 9–16.
35 Id. ¶ 10.
36 Id. ¶ 11.
37 Id. ¶ 12.
38 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶¶ 12–13.
39 Id. ¶ 13.
40 Injuries to Volodina included bruising to the soft tissue on her head and increased
risk of a miscarriage because she was nine weeks pregnant. Volodina underwent a
medically-induced abortion at this time. Id. ¶ 14.
41 Id. ¶ 15.
42 Id. ¶ 16.
32
33
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reasoning that a single punch did not constitute battery, which
requires a victim to sustain two or more punches. 43 Volodina again
fled to Moscow. 44
In July and August, S physically attacked Volodina, threatened
to kill her, and damaged the hydraulic braking system of her car. 45
Volodina pled to authorities for relief but was again denied because
a single blow did not constitute battery and the threats were
insufficient to prove her life was in danger. 46 Authorities also
refused to pursue criminal charges by classifying this violence as a
lover’s quarrel, noting that Volodina and S “knew each other, had
lived together before and had maintained a common household.” 47
In early 2018, S shared Volodina’s private photographs on
social media. 48 In March of the same year, S placed threatening
phone calls to Volodina and lurked around her home. 49 The police
declined to open an investigation, arguing there was no danger that
S would carry out his threats. 50 Later that month, when Volodina
was taking a taxi, S intercepted the taxi, jerked Volodina from the
car and began to drag her towards his car. 51 After Volodina sprayed
tear gas into S’s face, he grabbed her purse and fled. 52 Volodina
went to the police station to report this attack and S shortly arrived
and returned her items. 53 Police declined to open an investigation
stating that because the items had been returned, no crime had taken
place. 54
Volodina then asked for state protection. 55 The authorities
refused, noting that “‘no real threats to her person or property from
[S] . . . have been established.
The threats that [Volodina]
previously
complained
about
are
the
product
of
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 19.
Id. ¶ 20.
Id. ¶¶ 21–22.
Id. ¶ 23.
Id.
Id. ¶ 30.
Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 31.
Id.
Id. ¶ 32.
Id. ¶ 32 (2019).
Id. ¶¶ 32–33.
Id. ¶¶ 34–36.
Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 37.
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personal hostility between them and of [S]’s jealousy.’” 56 Volodina
has since legally changed her name to prevent S from finding her. 57
Volodina brought an action to the ECtHR against Russia in June
2017 58 alleging that “Russian authorities had failed in their duty to
prevent, investigate and prosecute acts of domestic violence which
she had suffered at the hands of her former partner and that [Russia]
had also failed to put in place a legal framework to combat genderbased discrimination against women.” 59 Volodina provided
evidence of the prevalence of domestic violence in Russia and its
adverse effects on women. 60 Evidence included a report from the
Ministry of the Interior finding in 2015 that 54,285 reports of crimes
in the home were reported of which 32,602 were against women; in
2016, the number of crimes in the home increased to 65,535 with
42,164 being against women; and in 2017, while the number
dropped to 38,311 reports of crimes in the home, 24,058 were
committed against women. 61 Other evidence introduced included
(1) a study from the Russian Federal Statistics Survey and the
Ministry of Health finding that 20% of women experienced physical
violence and 38% had been subjected to verbal abuse; 62 (2) a report
by the Anna Centre for the Prevention of Domestic Violence, a
Russian nongovernmental organization, which found “violence in
one form or another in every fourth family,” and that “two-thirds of
homicides were attributable to family/household-related motives,
that about 14,000 women died each year at the hands of their
husbands or relatives, and that up to 40% of all serious violent
crimes were committed within families[;]” 63 and (3) a report by
Russia’s High Commissioner for Human Rights who “noted a lack
of progress in addressing the problem of domestic violence[.]” 64
Id.
Id. ¶ 39.
58 Id. ¶¶ 1–3.
59 Id. ¶ 3.
60 Id. ¶¶ 40–45.
61 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 41.
62 Id. ¶ 42.
63 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 44.
64 Id. ¶ 45; see also Уполномоченный приняла участие в конференции
“Женщины против насилия” [The Commissioner Took Part in the Conference “Women
Against Violence”], УПОЛНОМОЧЕННОГО ПО ПРАВАМ ЧЕЛОВЕКА В РОССИЙСКОЙ
ФЕДЕРАЦИИ [COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. IN THE RUSS. FED’N] (Dec. 7, 2017),
http://ombudsmanrf.org/news/novosti_upolnomochennogo/view/upolnomochennyj_prinj
56
57
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The ECtHR held that Russia had violated Article 3 of the
Convention by allowing Ms. Volodina to be subject to repeated
torture, degradation, and inhuman treatment. 65 The court held
Russia responsible for the violations because it failed to meet three
obligations required of member-states in order to protect individuals
within their borders against ill treatment. 66
The breached
obligations to protect individuals include (1) establishing “an
adequate legal framework affording protection against ill-treatment
by private individuals;” (2) taking “reasonable measures . . . to
[protect against] a very real and immediate risk of ill-treatment of
which authorities knew[;]” and (3) conducting “an effective
investigation when an arguable claim of ill-treatment has been
raised[.]” 67
For the first obligation, the ECtHR found that because Russia’s
Criminal Code fails to “define domestic violence . . . as a separate
offence or an aggravating element of other offences . . . [the Code]
falls short of the requirements inherent in the State’s positive
obligation to establish and apply effectively a system punishing all
forms of domestic violence and providing sufficient safeguards for
victims.” 68 For the second obligation, the Court held Russia failed
to prevent occurrences of violence because authorities took no
measures of protections such as “restraining orders, protection
orders or safety orders” to stop further contact between the victim
and abuser. 69 Russia failed in its third obligation because it did not
open a full criminal case against S, instead opting to complete “preinvestigation inquiries” which were not “serious attempt[s]” to
protect Volodina. 70
Additionally, the ECtHR found Russia’s failure to adopt
ala_uchastie_v_konferencii_acirczhenshhiny_protiv_nasilijaacirc
[https://perma.cc/MZR2-ZRZK].
65 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 102.
66 The ECHR states that member-states have “positive obligations under Article 1 of
the Convention” that must be “read in conjunction with Article 3, to ensure that individuals
within their jurisdiction are protected against all forms of ill-treatment[.]” Id. ¶ 76.
67 Id. ¶ 77.
68 The Court further lamented that Russia failed its positive obligation to set a
framework where there is a “minimum threshold of gravity of injuries required for
launching public prosecution[.]” Id. ¶ 85. For a discussion on Russia private versus public
prosecution systems, see infra Part III.B.
69 See Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶¶ 88–90.
70 See id. ¶¶ 94–101.
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legislation or other protective measures had resulted in extensive
domestic violence nationwide, resulting in a “discriminatory effect
on women[,]” violative of Article 14 as the violence
disproportionately affects women, and that this lack of redress
means women do not have equal protection of the law. 71 Thus, the
ECtHR found Russia failed in its obligations to protect its female
citizens against domestic violence.
III. State of the Law Regarding Domestic Violence in Russia
A. Limitations of the Russian Criminal Code
Russia guarantees equality for all in its constitution, 72 but this
façade of protection quickly disintegrates in light of Russia’s lack
of legislation addressing domestic violence. Instead of relying on
guaranteed constitutional protections, victims are forced to ground
their domestic violence claims among other provisions in the
Russian Criminal Code. 73 This Code, however, offers little, if any,
remedy for victims as it fails to account for domestic violence
71 Id. ¶¶ 132–33 (“[T]he continued failure to adopt legislation to combat domestic
violence and the absence of any form of restraining or protection orders clearly
demonstrate . . . the problem of domestic violence in Russia and its discriminatory effect
on women.”). For a discussion on gender discrimination cases and the ECHR, see
generally, LISA MCINTOSH SUNDSTROM ET AL., COURTING GENDER JUSTICE: RUSSIA,
TURKEY, AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Oxford University Press 2019).
72 KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSKII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 19
(Russ.) (“Man and woman shall enjoy equal rights and freedoms and have equal
possibilities to exercise them.”).
73 See RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 8, arts. 111–116. Most neighboring
nations have policies to combat domestic violence. Russia is not a member of the EU, but
Russia’s close proximity to EU nations allows for comparisons between Russia and peer
nations. For instance, twenty-four of the twenty-seven member-states of the EU have
National Action Plans to combat “gender based violence.” Rosamund Shreeves & Martina
Prpic, Violence Against Women in the EU: State of Play, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RES. SERV.
7 (Nov. 2019), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/644190/
EPRS_BRI(2019)644190_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/59SC-F4H5]. Most member-states
have legislation to combat domestic violence, with thirteen member-states “imposing a
higher penalty under general criminal law provisions for violence within the
family/household or perpetrated by a current or ex-partner as an aggravated offence” and
nine member-states introducing the “specific, named offence of [domestic violence] or
violence against a close person into criminal law.” Jolanta Reingarde et al., Review of the
Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action in the EU Member States: Violence
Against Women—Victim Support, EUR. INST. FOR GENDER EQUAL. 23 (2012),
https://eige.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/Violence-against-Women-VictimSupport-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/QH6A-G44P].
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crimes and limits the victim’s ability to bring forth a claim.
For over two decades, there have been multiple efforts to enact
legislation to protect victims to no avail. 74 The first attempt was in
1993 by the Women of Russia political party whose effort was
discontinued after 40 revisions. 75 From 2012 to 2016, there was
another attempt to pass legislation that would allow for restraining
orders, but the bill was never adopted. 76 In 2016, a section on
“domestic battery” was added to the Criminal Code, but was soon
removed due to conservative backlash. 77 The latest attempt was in
fall of 2019, when activists submitted a draft to the Russian
parliament, but after the upper house of parliament published its
own version greatly differing from the original, the bill has since
stalled. 78
Russia’s Criminal Code does not distinguish between violence
in the home and violence between strangers. 79 Under the Code,
there are three types of assault: grievous bodily harm; medium
bodily harm; and minor bodily harm. 80 Article 111 defines grievous
bodily harm as the intentional infliction of a grave injury hazardous
to human life or harm involving the loss of sight, speech, hearing,
or any organ or the loss of the organ’s functions, and is punishable
by at least eight years in prison. 81 Article 112 defines assault by
medium bodily harm as involving the intentional infliction of injury
not hazardous to human life and having caused protracted injury to
health or considerable stable loss of general capacity for work by
not less than one-third, and is punishable by a term of six months to
See Alexey Yurtaev, Inside the Fight over Russia’s Domestic Violence Law,
(Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/russiadomestic-violence-law/ [https://perma.cc/9NSL-7PQL].
75 Id.
76 Id.; see also ADVOCS. FOR HUM. RTS., RUSSIAN FEDERATION STAKEHOLDER
REPORT FOR THE UNITED NATIONS UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW. 2 (Oct. 2017),
https://www.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org/uploads/the_advocates_russia_dv_upr_fina
l_to_upload.pdf [https://perma.cc/4VXW-CGPB].
77 See Maria Karnaukh & Robert Coalson, New Push to Pass Domestic Violence Law
Angers Russia’s ‘Traditional Values’ Conservatives, RADIOFREEEUR. RADIOLIBERTY
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-domestic-violence-law-traditional-valuesconservatives/30283060.html [https://perma.cc/HN7Y-TFUF].
78 Yurtaev, supra note 74. At the time of this publication, there has not been
legislation passed in Russia regarding domestic violence.
79 See Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 50.
80 See RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 8, arts. 111–116.
81 Id. art. 111.
74
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five years. 82 Article 115 defines assault by minor bodily harm as
the intentional infliction of light injury which has temporarily
damaged health or caused insignificant stable loss of general
capacity for work, and is punishable by fine up to 40,000 rubles or
the perpetrator’s salary for three months, or arrest for up to four
months or compulsory labor. 83 Domestic violence is often
categorized as assault by minor bodily harm, 84 meaning those
convicted face only fines or imprisonment for several months—
thus, perpetrators face little punishment for their actions.
Another offense often seen in domestic violence cases,
aggravated battery, 85 is defined in Article 116 as actions committed
for disorderly or discriminatory motives which have caused
physical pain but do not involve the consequences in Article 115. 86
Prior to 2017, aggravated battery contained a reference to “close
persons,” including partners, but in a 2017 amendment, Parliament
dropped this reference. 87 Now, only those who commit battery for
Id. art. 112.
Id. art. 115.
84 Martin R. Huecker & William Smock, Domestic Violence, NAT’L CTR. FOR
BIOTECH.
INFO.,
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK499891/
[https://perma.cc/2Q52-B792] (last updated Oct. 15, 2019) (“While most events are minor,
for example grabbing, shoving, pushing, slapping, and hitting, serious and sometimes fatal
injuries do occur.”); see also Types of Domestic Violence, ARIZ. COAL. TO END SEXUAL &
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://www.acesdv.org/domestic-violence-graphics/types-ofabuse/ [https://perma.cc/D89A-ER98] (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (finding that most types
of physical abuse include restraining, hitting, shaking, pulling, etc. which would not meet
the high bar of gravity or average gravity). But a sizable number of cases in Russia could
qualify for as elevated assault and be subject to public prosecution. For example, after
Margarita Gracheva divorced her husband for abuse, he drove her to a forest and chopped
off both her hands with an axe. Tunikova, App. No. 55974/16, ¶¶ 45–49. Domestic
violence escalates over time; thus, it is important that victims have recourse early on with
effective prosecution to stop further abuse and violence. Amy Thomson, Can It Really Go
That Far: Escalation in Domestic Violence, BREAK THE SILENCE AGAINST DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE (Dec. 22, 2017), https://breakthesilencedv.org/escalation-domestic-violence/
[https://perma.cc/GY6P-VZRD] (“It may take a while for the abuser to worsen the level
violence used against their victim, but it is likely to occur and could include significant
physical assault, rape, or strangulation.”).
85 See Caitlin Mahserjian, Comment, We’re All in This Together: A Global
Comparison on Domestic Violence and the Means Necessary to Combat It, 79 ALB. L.
REV. 297, 306 (2016).
86 Further, Article 116 covers violent acts committed out of motives based on
political, ideological, racial, national or religious hatred or enmity, or based on hatred for
a social group. RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 8, art. 116.
87 The amendment to Article 116 removed from the list of criminal offenses ones the
82
83
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racial, religious, political, social, or disorderly motives may be
charged with aggravated battery. 88 Non-aggravated battery, the
infliction of violent acts that cause physical pain but not for
“ruffian” or discriminatory motives, was de-criminalized in 2016
and classified as an administrative offense punishable by a fine or
detention. 89 Further, first-time, non-aggravated battery offenses
among family members are decriminalized, “signaling to abusers
that [domestic violence] is a less serious offense[,]” 90 and, so,
perpetrators get a free pass for initial, or infrequent, offenses.91
With the de-criminalization of non-aggravated battery, perpetrators
merely get a slap on the wrist for offenses. Because of the Code’s
failure to account for domestic violence, women are left with
insufficient protections in the current statutory scheme.
B. Shortcomings of Russia’s Private Prosecution System
Victims are further hindered by Russia’s private and public
prosecution system in which some offenses must be litigated by
private parties. 92 Only offenses of assault by grievous and medium
bodily harm are liable for public prosecution, meaning, for these
offenses, the police take over the entire process; offenses of assault
by minor bodily harm and offenses of battery are subject to private
or public-private prosecution. 93 Victims of domestic violence are
“battery of close persons that resulted in physical pain but did not inflict harm or other
consequences[.]” Isajanyan, supra note 8, at 3–4.
88 RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 8, art. 116.
89 Isajanyan, supra note 8, at 2–3.
KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII RF OB
ADMINISTRATIVNYKH PRAVONARUSHENIIAKH [KOAP RF] [Code of Administrative
Violations], art. 6.1.1 (Russ.) [hereinafter RUSSIAN CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSES];
RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 8, art. 116.1.
90 Jacqulyn Kantack, European Court Slams Russia over Domestic Violence Case,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/08/22/europeancourt-slams-russia-over-domestic-violence-case [https://perma.cc/JLB8-YS93];
see
RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 8, art. 116.1.
91 See Kantack, supra note 90.
92 See UGOLOVNO-PROTSESSUAL’NYI KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [UPK RF]
[Criminal Procedure Code] art. 20(1) (Russ.) [hereinafter RUSSIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CODE].
93 Id. art. 20(2) (“[C]riminal cases on crimes envisaged by Articles 115, Part One and
116, Part One of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, are seen as criminal cases
of private prosecution, are initiated only upon application from the victim or from his legal
representative[.]”); id. art. 20(3) (providing that criminal cases of public-private
prosecution include criminal cases of crimes under Article 116.); id. art. 20(5) (providing
that criminal cases, with the exception of the criminal cases referred to in parts two and
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disproportionately affected because interfamilial violence is often
classified as assault by minor bodily harm or battery, and, therefore,
only eligible for private prosecution. 94 When offenses are subject
to private prosecution, the onus is on victims to “collect evidence,
identify the perpetrator, secure witness testimony and bring charges
before a court.” 95 Private prosecution requires that the victim
initiate the proceedings with Russian courts, and if a victim wants
legal representation, she must obtain counsel through her own
resources. 96 This places a large burden on victims mentally and
financially and is unlike public prosecutions in which it is the
authorities who collect evidence and bear the cost. 97 Alarmingly, in
private prosecution, “the failure of the victim to appear without
serious reasons shall entail the termination of the criminal case[.]” 98
And cases of private prosecution are subject to “reconciliation” in
which suits are terminated if the parties reconcile; meaning, no
prosecutor will step in—as soon as the victim stops pushing for
justice, any avenue of redress has ended. 99 Such procedural hurdles
imposes a hardship on victims, already suffering mentally and
physically, to actively pursue a potential lengthy case and see it to
the end.
A private prosecutorial system is antithetical to the cyclical
nature of domestic violence, 100 and it is not surprising that 90% of
private prosecution cases are terminated. 101 Often, victims will take
action, such as filing a complaint, immediately after the abuse has
three of this article, are considered criminal cases of public prosecution).
94 See Huecker & Smock, supra note 84.
95 Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 46.
96 See RUSSIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 92, art. 246(3) (“On criminal
cases of the private prosecution the charge in the judicial proceedings shall be supported
by the victim.”).
97 See Kantack, supra note 90 (“[Authorities] force victims to seek justice through
private prosecution, a process that is both expensive and demanding upon the victim.”).
98 RUSSIAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE, supra note 92, art. 249(3).
99 Id. art. 20(2). Courts are required to explain reconciliation to the parties. Id. art
319(5).
100 See Domestic Violence Against Women in the Russian Federation, ANNA – CTR.
FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 5–7 (Oct. 2015), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/
CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/RUS/INT_CEDAW_NGO_RUS_21870_E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7Z52-A6JZ].
101 Id. at 6. (“[T]he vast majority of cases of private complaint (90%) are terminated
for two reasons: (1) The failure to fulfil the court’s requirements to resolve the
shortcomings of the complaint; (2) The reconciliation of the parties.”).
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occurred. 102 However, as time passes, the victim will “remove the
complaint” for various reasons, leaving the perpetrator facing no
consequences. 103 Victims of domestic violence are often hesitant to
face their abusers in court, will recant statements, or even return to
their abusers. 104 Some recant out of fear for their or their children’s
safety. 105 Victims may also be financially dependent on their
abusers and feel returning to them is the only option. 106 Victims
often return to partners who have repented for their former
behavior—this “honeymoon phase” is an expected component of
the domestic violence cycle. 107 Because victims struggle to bring
their abuser to justice for emotional, physical, and financial reasons,
private prosecution is the wrong way to ensure victims are protected
and abusers are prosecuted.
In its current state, the Sisyphean task placed on victims to seek
justice in Russia signals a structure intentionally designed for the
victim to fail. 108 Significant burden is placed on the victim to seek
justice in the private prosecutorial scheme, and even when a victim
does follow procedures, Russian law is very forgiving for both nonlethal violence and first-time offenses, 109 granting perpetrators
Id.
Id.
104 See id.
105 Why Do Victims Stay?, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
https://ncadv.org/why-do-victims-stay [https://perma.cc/2NG5-LQ4B] (last visited Jan.
26, 2020); see also Rachel Louis Snyder, We Prosecute Murder Without the Victim’s Help.
TIMES
(May
4,
2019),
Why
Not
Domestic
Violence?,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/04/opinion/sunday/domestic-violence-recantingcrawford.html [https://perma.cc/YF5D-E6M2] (“Domestic violence victims recant their
testimony as much as 70 percent of the time . . . . [Victims] do so to protect themselves
against their abusers’ retaliation when they feel that authorities cannot or will not help.”).
106 Why Do Victims Stay?, supra note 105.
107 Jennifer Focht, The Cycle of Domestic Violence, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH RES.,
http://www.center4research.org/cycle-domestic-violence/ [https://perma.cc/46ZX-PA2L]
(last visited Jan. 26, 2020) (explaining the cycle involves (1) the tension building phase;
(2) the abusive incident; and (3) the honeymoon phase, during which “the abuser may
apologize, buy gifts, or be extra affectionate to ‘make up’ for the abuse. Many will promise
to change, promise to stop abusing, or promise that it will never happen again. These
assurances are intended to persuade the survivor to stay in the relationship.”).
108 Snyder, supra note 105.
109 See Domestic Violence Against Women in the Russian Federation, supra note 100,
at 5-7 (explaining that there is a heavy burden on women in domestic violence cases); see
also Kantack, supra note 90; RUSSIAN CRIMINAL CODE, supra note 9, art. 116.1 (showing
that first time and non-lethal offenses are lightly punished).
102
103
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freedom to act with impunity. 110 Because of the limitations of the
Russian Criminal Code and the shortcomings of private
prosecution, the Russian criminal system lacks sufficient
protections for victims of domestic violence.
IV. A Culture of Acceptance
A. A Lack of Knowledge Regarding Domestic Violence
Statistics in Russia
The extent of domestic violence in Russia remains unknown as
the government “does not maintain centralized, disaggregated
statistics[,]” but even modest estimates illustrate its ubiquity—
sustaining a culture of acceptance of domestic violence. 111
Exacerbating this insufficiency is the fact that partner violence is
not an independent legal offense which would enable better tracking
of incidents. 112 Despite these barriers to information, nongovernmental studies estimate that 36,000 women suffer physical
violence daily with 14,000 women killed by family members each
year. 113
Actual instances of domestic violence are likely higher than
current estimates given that domestic violence is a universally
under-reported crime. 114 Countries with available data report that,
“only 40 per cent of [] women who experience violence seek help
of any sort[.]” 115 Among women who do come forward, most look
to family and friends for support, with very few turning to formal
institutions, such as police and health services, for redress. 116 Most
victims remain silent due to “fear of reprisals, economic and

110 See Higgins, supra note 13. Ms. Volodina’s attorney commented upon the
decriminalization of battery, noting that “[i]n Russia, [perpetrators] get one free beating a
year.” Id.
111 Isajanyan, supra note 8, at 1–2; see also Amnesty Int’l, Russian Federation:
Briefing to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 12, AI
Index EUR 46/022/2010 (July 2010) (“[T]he true scale of domestic violence against
women in Russia remains unknown.”); SUNDSTROM ET AL., supra note 71, at 145–46.
112 See supra Part II.B, III.
113 Isajanyan, supra note 8, at 2.
114 See Facts and Figures: Ending Violence Against Women, UN WOMEN,
https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/facts-andfigures [https://perma.cc/T4ZM-XG7Z] (last updated Nov. 2020).
115 Id.
116 Id.
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psychological dependence, anticipation that the police will not take
the charges seriously and viewing the assault as a private matter.” 117
A 2014-15 survey found that over one-half of respondents in Russia
had either experienced domestic violence or knew someone who
had. 118 However, this estimate is likely skewed low, considering
that 60 to 70 percent of women who experience domestic violence
in Russia make no report. 119 Even with conservative estimates,
domestic violence is an egregious and pervasive problem in Russia.
B. Partner Violence as the Norm in Russian Culture
1. Institutional Bias
Compared to other victims of domestic violence across the
globe, Russian women are even less likely to seek help because of
institutional bias and a culture unsympathetic to victims. 120 As
evidenced by Volodina’s case, authorities rarely provide avenues of
redress. 121 One attorney described the “typical police attitude as
[one] requiring homicidal-level violence to secure their attention,
suggesting that police intonate ‘[i]f there is a dead body, we will
come,’ or ‘[c]all us if you’re murdered.’” 122 Even when authorities
act, punishments are mild, including “modest fines from 5,000 to
30,000 rubles, 60 to 120 hours of compulsory work or, rarely, 10—
15 days of confinement.” 123 Such dismissive attitudes and lack of
117 U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, GLOBAL STUDY ON HOMICIDE: GENDER-RELATED
KILLING OF WOMEN AND GIRLS 42 (Nov. 2018), https://www.unodc.org/documents/dataand-analysis/GSH2018/GSH18_Gender-related_killing_of_women_and_girls.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5HU8-YELQ]. According to Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Executive
Director of U.N. Women, “[w]e still do not know the true extent of violence against
women, as the fear of reprisals, impact of not being believed, and the stigma borne by the
survivor — not the perpetrator — have silenced the voices of millions of survivors of
violence and masked the true extent of women’s continued horrific experiences[.]”
Deanna Paul, U.N. Finds the Deadliest Place for Women Is Their Home, WASH. POST,
(Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/11/26/un-finds-deadliestplace-women-is-their-home/ [https://perma.cc/LE94-E9F6].
118 Higgins, supra note 13.
119 One reason women may not report violence is the lack of redress. Only 3 percent
of such cases go to trial. Gorbunova, supra note 7.
120 See generally Isajanyan, supra note 8 (describing the active discouragement of
reporting and lack of legal structure to protect victims of domestic violence).
121 See supra Part II.B.
122 ADVOCS. OF HUM. RTS., supra note 76, at 5.
123 Id. In U.S. dollars, this range is approximately $72.00 to $438.00 as of June 11,
2020. Currency Converter, BUS. INSIDER, https://markets.businessinsider.com/currency-
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enforcement discourage victims from reporting crimes. 124 For
instance, 72 percent of women who called the national help line
never sought aid from police, and of those who did call, 80 percent
were unsatisfied with police response. 125 The institutional bias
against victims present in Russia law enforcement benefits
perpetrators and promotes domestic violence as a norm.
This bias is present even in the upper echelon of the Russian
government. President Vladimir Putin, who is not likely to
relinquish power anytime soon, promotes a conservative culture
sympathetic to perpetrators. 126 In 2017, President Putin proudly
signed into law the decriminalization of domestic abuse by making
aggravated battery among “close persons” an administrative
offense. 127 Putin has been president since 2012 and the de facto
leader of Russia since 2000. 128 In this time, Putin has taken over
much of the Russia government, directly and indirectly. 129
Parliament rubber-stamps all of his proposals 130 and the Kremlin
controls Russian television. 131 In early 2020, the entire government
resigned, with the Prime Minister being replaced by Mikhail V.
Mishustin, an obscure tax chief who is seen as a “technocratic

converter/russian-ruble_united-states-dollar [https://perma.cc/3YRW-WQFT] (last visited
June 11, 2020).
124 See Gorbunova, supra note 7.
125 Domestic Violence Against Women in the Russian Federation, supra note 100, at
3.
126 Feliz Solomon, Vladimir Putin Just Signed Off on the Partial
Decriminalization of Domestic Abuse in Russia, TIME (Feb. 8, 2017),
https://time.com/4663532/russia-putin-decriminalize-domestic-abuse/
[https://perma.cc/F6NK-DZC8].
127 Id. See supra Part III.A.
128 Masha Gessen, The Willful Ambiguity of Putin’s Latest Power Grab, NEW YORKER
(Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-willful-ambiguityof-putins-latest-power-grab [https://perma.cc/8M5M-UDQ6].
129 Id. (“Putin wields such power over all aspects of Russian government that
consolidation is hardly possible; Russian courts take dictation from the President and bend
the law any way he wants—plus, the parliament is always ready to rubber-stamp any law
into existence at a moment’s notice[.]”).
130 Id.
131 See generally Daria Litvinova, Human Wrongs: How State-Backed Media Helped
the Kremlin Weaponise Social Conservatism, REUTERS INST. (July 2018),
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/201810/Daria%20Litvinova%20Journalist%20Fellow%20paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/VRN7AM8C] (providing an overview of how the Kremlin gained control over Russian media).
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placeholder” to allow Putin to continue holding power. 132 Putin has
also introduced constitutional reforms, approved by Parliament,133
and ratified by voters, allowing him to remain in power until
2036. 134 Thus, Putin will likely be leader for life. 135 With a
president who does not support domestic violence reform, has full
authority to pass legislation at will, and is likely to be in power
indefinitely, it will be hard to effectuate change that advances
protection for domestic violence victims.
This widespread bias against victims has led to few institutional
protections. 136 No national programs combatting domestic violence
exist and there is a shortage of crisis centers. 137 In fact, it is
international non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) that
provide the most programs and on-the-ground protection. 138 But
even NGOs are hampered in their efforts due to the Foreign Agents
Law, passed in 2012, which requires NGOs to register as foreign
agents if they receive foreign funding. 139 This designation “is
tantamount to being labeled spy or traitor[,]” 140 so many NGOs
132 Polina Ivanova & Katya Golubkova, ‘Technocratic Placeholder’? Putin Picks
Low–Profile Tax Chief as Russian PM, REUTERS (Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-mishustin/technocratic-placeholder-putinpicks-low-profile-tax-chief-as-russian-pm-idUSKBN1ZE2OO [https://perma.cc/F9A9WNEJ]; see also Anton Troianovski, Big Changes? Or Maybe Not. Putin’s Plans Keep
Russia Guessing, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/21/
world/europe/putin-russia-changes.html [https://perma.cc/B645-WQSW].
133 Anton Troianovski, Putin Endorses Brazen Remedy to Extend His Rule, Possibly
for Life, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/10/world/
europe/putin-president-russia.html [https://perma.cc/Z4AE-R7KS].
134 Andrew Higgins, The Theatrical Method in Putin’s Vote Madness, N.Y. TIMES
(July 1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/world/europe/putin-referendumvote-russia.html [https://perma.cc/TY6A-TS9S].
135 Id. See Andrew Higgins, Russia’s Highest Court Opens Way for Putin to Rule
Until 2036, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/
world/europe/russia-putin-president-for-life.html [https://perma.cc/ET9X-SEDU].
136 See supra Part III.
137 ADVOCS. FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 76, at 6.
138 Id. (“Moscow has approximately 150 shelter spaces to serve a city of 12 million
people . . . Nationally, at best, existing shelters provide only a few hundred beds in a
country of 140 million . . . Approximately 20 NGOs throughout the country also operate a
small number of crisis centers and shelters.”).
139 Id.; see also Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups: The Battle Chronicle, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (June 18, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/russia-government-against-rightsgroups-battle-chronicle [https://perma.cc/2ZUU-HE25].
140 ADVOCS. FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 76, at 6.
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have closed their doors after this designation from lack of support. 141
A lack of governmental support means avenues of change and
awareness, such as protesting and the arts, are limited. All public
protests require government authorization and “anyone caught in an
unsanctioned protest more than once in a six-month period risks
being fined anywhere between 600,000 to one million rubles . . . or
up to [f]ive [sic] years of forced labor or prison.” 142 Furthermore,
there is an attack on the arts in Russia deemed avant garde. A ballet
that featured nudity and a homosexual relationship was cancelled
two days before its premiere. 143 While the official statement cited
production issues, rumors exist that the company received a call
from a Kremlin official or Orthodox cleric, prompting the
cancellation. 144 With a government refusing to protect some of the
most vulnerable members of society, it is possible this attitude has
seeped down to the citizenry who also accept domestic violence as
the norm.
2. Rise of Conservatism
Beyond institutional bias, a cultural issue exists concerning
opinions of domestic violence. 145 A resurgence of conservative
values in Russia has cemented men as the patriarchal head of the
household. 146 And the rise of President Putin has pushed masculine
141 Id.; Russia: Government vs. Rights Groups: The Battle Chronicle, supra note 139
(“To date, Russia’s Justice Ministry has designated 158 groups as ‘foreign agents,’ courts
have levied staggering fines on many groups for failing to comply with the law, and about
30 groups have shut down rather than wear the ‘foreign agent’ label.”).
142 The currency conversion is approximately $17,124 to $28,540. Madeline
Roache, Russia’s Version of #MeToo Has Struggled to Take Off — Until Now, TIME,
https://time.com/5636107/metoo-russia-womens-rights/ [https://perma.cc/S5D2-PZRX]
(last updated Aug. 2, 2019). A fine for protesting is astronomically larger than that of a
fine for the administrative offence of battery. For the entire statutory scheme regarding
protesting, see RUSSIAN CODE OF ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLATIONS, supra note 89, art. 20.
143 Joshua Yaffa, ‘They Will Destroy You’: In Putin’s Russia, How Far Can an Artist
Go?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/17/putinkirill-serebrennikov-arts-clampdown-russia-bolshoi [https://perma.cc/3XK7-XKLZ].
144 Id.
145 Higgins, supra note 13; see also Andrew Stickely et al., Attitudes Toward Intimate
Partner Violence Against Women in Moscow, Russia, 23 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 447, 447
(2008) (finding in a study that less than half of Russians surveyed thought partner violence
against women was a serious problem).
146 See ADVOCS. FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 76, at 2. Upon Putin’s re-election in 2012,
he has pushed more conservative policies on social issues such as domestic violence,
including a law banning gay “propaganda.” Gabriela Baczynska, Victims of Domestic
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ideals to the forefront of Russian culture. 147 This movement does
not view domestic violence as problematic and is typically against
progressive ideas like LGBTQ and women’s rights. 148 The Russian
Orthodox Church, a pillar of the conservative movement, 149 is
against feminism; in fact, the head of the Church, Patriarch Kirill,
called feminism a “dangerous phenomenon[.]” 150
Russia’s
conservative institutions also support familial violence to keep their
values dominant; for instance, the Parents’ Meeting, “promote[s]
physical punishment in a family as a cultural tradition.” 151
Conservative proponents in Russian government and society
perpetuate the belief that it is not only acceptable, but expected, that
a husband will beat his wife to ensure his authority. 152
Conservatives have been able to effectively organize and push
their agendas to maintain their support of domestic violence.
Currently, more than 180 “traditional values” organizations exist in
Russia. 153 These groups sometimes use acts of terror to promote
their agenda; in 2017, groups mounted attacks against the film,
Matilda, which described the affair of Crown Prince Nicholas, later
Tsar Nicholas II, and a Polish ballerina. 154 Assailants, angered by
Violence Face Uphill Battle for Protection in Russia, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2013),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-women-violence/victims-of-domesticviolence-face-uphill-battle-for-protection-in-russia-idUSBRE97J0CX20130820
[https://perma.cc/5EPN-R5U3].
147 Oleg Riabov & Tatiana Riabovca, The Remasculinization of Russia? Gender,
Nationalism, and the Legitimation of Power Under Vladimir Putin, 61 PROBS. OF POSTCOMMUNISM 23, 28 (2014). For a discussion on how President Putin uses his masculinity
to rule Russia, see generally, Elizabeth A. Wood, Hypermasculinity as a Scenario of
Power, 18 INT’L FEMINIST J. POL. 329 (2016).
148 See Riabov & Riabovca, supra note 147, at 29.
149 See generally Kristina Stoeckl, The Russian Orthodox Church’s Conservative
Crusade, 116 CURRENT HIST. 271 (2017) (holding that the Russian Orthodox church is a
dominant force in Russian culture that works alongside President Putin and its values are
reflected in domestic violence laws and LGBTQ issues).
150 Roache, supra note 142.
151 Domestic Violence Against Women in the Russian Federation, supra note 100, at
7–8; see also Adams, supra note 5, at 67 (“The violence in these societies is often more
severe and remains part of the social fabric.”).
152 ADVOCS. FOR HUM. RTS., supra note 76, at 5; see also Roache, supra note 142.
153 See Karnaukh & Coalson, supra note 77.
154 Mumin Shakirov & Robert Coalson, Matilda Director Urges Russian Government
to Respond to Campaign of Threats, Violence, RADIOFREEEUR. RADIOLIBERTY (Sept. 20,
2017), https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-matilda-uchitel-campaign-threats-tsar-nicholas/28
747047.html [https://perma.cc/X6US-P8YY].
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the negative portrayal of the Tsar who was “canonized as an
Orthodox saint in 2000[,]” assaulted the studio with Molotov
cocktails, and attempted to ram a car into a cinema screening the
film. 155 Conservatives push against reforms they consider “attacks”
on Russian lifestyle—Andrei Kormukhin, the leader of Forty
Forties, a Russian Orthodox organization, criticized the 2019 draft
legislation on domestic violence, asking “[w]hy should our
conservative-traditional country—which, according to our leader,
has its own, unique civilization—adopt foreign values?” 156
Conservatives find social change like pro-LGBT ballets and
protective legislation a “forcible alteration of the basic foundations
of Russian society and the destruction of [] traditional family and
moral values[,]” 157 and fight to maintain the status quo developed
under President Putin.
Even Russian citizens unaffiliated with the conservative
movement or the Orthodox church hold traditional values and are
likely to hold perpetrators blameless for acts of violence. 158 In 2017,
as the media spotlight was focused upon ex-film producer Harvey
Weinstein and his repeated sexual assaults of female actresses, the
Russian public opinion was split with some blaming the victims.159
Even among female actresses, opinions were polarized. 160 Actress
Lyubov Tolkalina responded to the Weinstein allegations, stating,
“If you land a role, does it matter how you got it? How can you
blame a man for sexual harassment, isn’t it his meaning of life?” 161
Fellow actress Agnia Kuznetsova reiterated the sentiment, stating,
Id.
Karnaukh & Coalson, supra note 77.
157 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). At one protest against the 2019 proposed
domestic violence bill, protestors distributed pamphlets warning that a bill criminalizing
domestic violence would be a slippery slope and lead to Russia “turning into Sodom and
Gomorrah and dying, just like Europe.” Samantha Berkhead, Russia Faces Up to Its Dark
TIMES
(Dec.
6,
2019),
Domestic
Violence
Problem,
MOSCOW
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/12/06/russia-faces-domestic-violence-a68488
[https://perma.cc/D4NH-CFAR] (internal quotations omitted).
158 See Roache, supra note 142 (“According to [Russian family lawyer Mari]
Davtyan, the overarching attitudes imply women are to blame for not acting properly.”).
159 Oleg Yegorov, ‘How Can You Blame a Man for Sexual Harassment?’ Russians
React to the Harvey Weinstein Scandal, RUSS. BEYOND (Oct. 19, 2017),
https://www.rbth.com/arts/326460-harvey-weinstein-russia
[https://perma.cc/32JMA2YR].
160 Id.
161 Id.
155
156
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“These gals got what they wanted[.]” 162
In contrast to conservative Russians who see domestic violence
advocacy as “ideas imported from the West” that erode “traditional
norms,” progressive citizens advocating for reform are typically
younger. 163 However, Russia’s population is imbalanced with lower
child birth rates and a growing elderly population. 164 By 2050,
Russia “is projected to have more seniors than young children”;
therefore, with imbalanced demographics, it is difficult for the
youth solely to effectuate change. 165
These attitudes mean that when victims do come forward, they
face victim blaming by both the police and the public. 166 Darya
Ageniy, a nineteen year old who was raped, is currently facing
criminal charges for injuring her rapist after she fought back. 167
Authorities also told Ageniy that she should have “called the police
while she was being attacked, instead of trying to defend herself.”168
Similarly, members of the Orthodox Church blame women for
violence perpetrated against them. 169 The late Archpriest Vsevolod
Chaplin argued that rape victims are to blame due to their
“indecent[,]” “provocative” appearances. 170 Even fellow citizens

162 But Russian director Zhora Kryzhovnikov stood in solidarity with Weinstein’s
victims calling this “another battle for the rights of women, which they won[.]” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
163 Higgins, supra note 13; see also Domestic Violence Against Women in the Russian
Federation, supra note 100, at 7.
164 Rakesh Kochhar, Attitudes About Aging: A Global Perspective, PEW RES. CTR.
(Jan. 30, 2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2014/01/30/chapter-2-aging-in-theu-s-and-other-countries-2010-to-2050/ [https://perma.cc/QP37-VAUW].
165 Id.
166 Philippa H. Stewart, Interview: Giving a Green Light to Abuse in Russia, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/25/interview-givinggreen-light-abuse-russia [https://perma.cc/4S2Y-MWJV] (“We heard many reports of
police being dismissive and sometimes mocking or blaming the woman.”).
167 Sukhada Tatke, Outrage in Russia over Murder Charges Against Teenage Victims
of Domestic Violence, EURONEWS, https://www.euronews.com/2019/07/05/outrage-inrussia-over-murder-charges-against-teenage-victims-of-domestic-violence
[https://perma.cc/65AN-XEL8] (last updated July 6, 2019).
168 Id.
169 Roache, supra note 142.
170 Id. The Archpriest passed away unexpectedly in January of 2020. Russian
Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin Dies at 51, TASS: RUSS. NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 26, 2020),
https://tass.com/society/1113089 [https://perma.cc/GF8P-2R9K].
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are quick to blame the victim. 171 After one woman shared her story
of abuse from her spouse on social media, one user asked, “Why
didn’t you just marry a normal guy, instead of an asshole?” 172 The
conservative culture which has gripped Russia is not one that is keen
on protecting victims of domestic violence; in fact, the goal is to
keep families together, regardless of the cost to its members.
V. Future Implications
A. Current Actions in the Russian Legislature
In fall of 2019, shortly after the Volodina ruling, activists,
legislators, and lawyers developed and submitted a draft law to the
Russian parliament addressing domestic violence. 173 Later that
year, Russian Parliament released a draft of their own bill. 174 The
Parliament bill acknowledges the existence of domestic violence as
a crime and defines it as a “a deliberate act causing or containing
the threat of causing physical and (or) mental suffering and (or)
property damage[.]” 175 Only spouses, former spouses, persons with
a common child, close relatives, and those living together or owning
the same property are able to be convicted of domestic violence. 176
The bill also allows protective orders to be issued to stop all contact
between the perpetrator and victim; 177 however, this judicial
restraining order can only be issued if it is shown the perpetrator has
another place to live. 178 Unfortunately, there are no provisions
allowing for the criminal prosecution of perpetrators. 179
The bill has faced backlash on both sides. 180 Over 180
conservative organizations have signed an “open letter denouncing
See Roache, supra note 142.
Id.
173 Proposed Russian Domestic Violence Bill Prioritises “Preserving Family” over
the Life and Health of Women, EQUALITY NOW (Dec. 12, 2019),
https://www.equalitynow.org/proposed_russian_dv_bil_2019 [https://perma.cc/U6YYQ99B] [hereinafter Proposed Russian Domestic Violence Bill]; see also Yurtaev, supra
note 74.
174 See generally Draft Law on the Prevention of Domestic Violence, supra note 16.
175 Id. art. 2.
176 Id.
177 Id. art. 24.
178 Id. art. 25.
179 See generally id.
180 See generally Proposed Russian Domestic Violence Bill, supra note 173.
171
172
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the proposed bill” labeling it as an attack on traditional Russian
values. 181 CitizenGo, a conservative advocacy group, began an
online petition with over 35,000 signatures against the bill, framing
it as “based on the radical anti-family ideology of feminism[.]” 182
Alternatively, supporters of enacting reform legislation argue the
bill fails to (1) criminalize domestic violence, (2) cover all forms of
violence, and (3) protect all at risk of domestic violence with its
narrow definition of who is protected. 183 The bill is currently in
flux, but with strong public backlash and a history of over 40
domestic violence bills previously quashed in the last two decades,
it is a grim outlook for the bill becoming law. 184
B. External Forces of Change
It is possible that external pressures outside of Russia could
persuade the government to enact reform. Several avenues of action
and their potential for success are discussed below.
1. Treaties
Intergovernmental organizations have not been successful in
persuading Russia to make reforms. 185 The Council of Europe, in
an attempt to combat interfamilial violence, held the Convention on
Preventing and Combating Violence Against Women and Domestic
Violence (“Istanbul Convention”) in 2011 which entered into force
in 2014. 186 Russia, as a member of the Council, declined to sign or
ratify the Istanbul Convention—only one other country, Azerbaijan,

181 See Мы против принятия Закона о профилактике домашнего насилия! [We
Are Against the Adoption of the Domestic Violence Prevention Act!], REGNUM (Oct. 15,
2019), https://regnum.ru/news/polit/2748248.html [https://perma.cc/9RS6-A6BY].
182 Остановим антисемейный закон о “домашнем насилии”! [Stop the AntiFamily Law on “Domestic Violence”!], CITIZENGO (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://www.citizengo.org/ru/fm/174541-ostanovim-antisemeynyy-zakon-o-domashnemnasilii [https://perma.cc/49W2-8X95].
183 See generally Proposed Russian Domestic Violence Bill, supra note 173.
184 Karnaukh & Coalson, supra note 77.
185 See Jennifer L. Ulrich, Confronting Gender-Based Violence with International
Instruments: Is a Solution to the Pandemic Within Reach?, 7 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD.
629, 645 (2000) (stating that most international treaties are “hindered by enforcement
problems”).
186 See Historical Background, COUNCIL EUR., https://www.coe.int/en/web/istanbulconvention/historical-background [https://perma.cc/YR4B-Z4RH] (last visited Jan. 30,
2020).
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has declined to sign. 187
But even treaties to which Russia is a party fail to advance
change due to a lack of enforcement measures. 188 Ratifying a treaty
promising to give individuals enumerated human rights does not
guarantee that a state will follow through with its obligations. 189 For
example, Russia is a party to the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which is a bill of
rights for women enacted by the United Nations. 190 The Committee
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(“CEDAW”) monitors the implementation of the Convention by
collecting reports from member-states on their progress in fulfilling
the Convention. 191
CEDAW can also issue general
recommendations on how member-states can come into compliance
with the Convention. 192 Like the ECtHR, individuals can bring
complaints against member-states alleging the state has violated the
Convention 193 and the CEDAW committee can issue a quasijudicial ruling. 194 Per General Recommendation No. 19, CEDAW
considers gender violence a form of discrimination and places on its
members a positive obligation to “act with due diligence to prevent
violations of rights or to investigate and punish acts of violence, and

187 See Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of Treaty 210, COUNCIL EUR.,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/210/signatures?des
ktop=true [https://perma.cc/NT8C-JCPZ] (last updated Oct. 31, 2020).
188 See Ingrid Wuerth, International Law in the Post–Human Rights Era, 96 TEX. L.
REV. 279, 344 (2017).
189 See id. at 364 (“The ratification of certain treaties has had modest positive effects
on human rights practices of some countries, while ratification of others has not, and some
studies even show a correlation between the ratification of certain human rights treaties
and more human rights violations.”).
190 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 10, ¶ 14.
191 Introduction of the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against
Women,
OHCHR,
https://www.ohchr.org/
EN/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Introduction.aspx [https://perma.cc/H8WJ-ZCRG] (last
visited Oct. 31, 2020).
192 Id.
193 G.A. Res. 54/4, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, art. 2 (Oct. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Optional
Protocol].
194 Note on the Different Procedures Within the UN System Dealing with Women’s
Human
Rights
Violations,
OHCHR,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Women/WGWomen/Pages/Differentproceduresdealing
withwomen.aspx [https://perma.cc/P22P-LXNN] (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
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for providing compensation.” 195
In 2019, the CEDAW Committee ruled in three cases that
Russia failed the due diligence standard to protect victims of
domestic violence. 196 These cases were brought by women who had
experienced partner violence 197 with little to no assistance from
Russian authorities, 198 and each alleged a violation of General
Recommendation No. 19. 199 The CEDAW Committee found Russia
had failed to implement the Convention, 200 required Russia to
financially compensate the women, 201 recommended Russia
criminalize gender-based violence, provide adequate investigation
of domestic violence, give free legal counsel to victims, develop
adequate training for authorities, etc. 202 But Russia has little reason
to comply with these rulings as the Committee has no power to
sanction member-states who violate the Convention. 203 In fact,
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19, supra note 10, ¶ 9 (emphasis added).
CEDAW, Views Adopted by the Committee Under Article 7 (3) of the Optional
Protocol, Concerning Comm. No. 65/2014 on Its Seventy-Second Session, U.N. Doc.
C/72/D/65/2014 (Apr. 8, 2019) [hereinafter S.T. v. Russia]; CEDAW, Views Adopted by
the Committee Under Article 7 (3) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Comm. No.
100/2016 on Its Seventy-Third Session, U.N. Doc. C/73/D/100/2016 [hereinafter X. & Y.
v. Russia].
197 S.T. v. Russia, supra note 196, ¶¶ 2.1–2.9; X. & Y. v. Russia, supra note 196, ¶¶
2.1–2.11, 2.18–2.26.
198 S.T. v. Russia, supra note 196, ¶¶ 2.10–2.22; X. & Y. v. Russia, supra note 196,
¶¶ 2.11–2.17, 2.26–2.30.
199 S.T. v. Russia, supra note 196, ¶¶ 3.2 n.3; X. & Y. v. Russia, supra note 196, ¶¶
3.1–3.3.
200 S.T. v. Russia, supra note 196, ¶ 10; X. & Y. v. Russia, supra note 196, ¶¶ 9.4–
9.8.
201 S.T. v. Russia, supra note 196, ¶ 11(a); X. & Y. v. Russia, supra note 196, ¶
11(a)(ii).
202 S.T. v. Russia, supra note 196, ¶ 11(b); X. & Y. v. Russia, supra note 196, ¶ 11(b).
203 Vedna Jivan & Christine Forster, Challenging Conventions: In Pursuit of Greater
Legislative Compliance with CEDAW in the Pacific, 10 MELB. J. INT’L L., 655, 688 (2009).
The Committee has faced criticism in that it “is not truly an enforcement mechanism, but
rather a monitoring body lacking enforcement powers” which is a “characteristic that
severely undermines its ability to facilitate and improve women’s rights.” Id. at 688–89.
Compliance is primarily measured in member–state self-reports on their progress
implementing the treaty. Neil Englehart & Melissa K. Miller, The CEDAW Effect:
International Law’s Impact on Women’s Rights, 13 J. HUM. RTS., 22, 24–31 (2014)
(finding that CEDAW has a modest impact on women’s social rights after ratification);
Ulrich, supra note 185, at 644–46. See generally Optional Protocol, supra note 193
(providing no sanctions or consequences for member states failing to follow the CEDAW
Committee’s recommendations).
195
196
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Russia has yet to take steps to come into compliance with their
positive obligations under the Convention and with no
consequences for non-compliance, it does not appear the ratification
of a treaty will push Russia to make changes to its current domestic
violence framework. 204
2. Further ECtHR Cases
While many peer nations have developed reforms to protect
victims, Russia has yet to partake, 205 but as international attention
to the problem mounts, Russia may be pressured to take action. 206
Four additional cases like Volodina’s are pending before the
ECtHR. 207 In 2016, Natalya Tunikova filed a suit after a Justice of
the Peace dismissed her private prosecution appeal against her
abuser for being 16 minutes late to the hearing. 208 Ms. Tunikova
was then convicted of grievous bodily harm for stabbing her abuser
in an attempt to defend herself from being thrown off the balcony. 209
Elena Gershman filed suit in 2017 after her spouse was acquitted of
assault and police refused to institute criminal proceedings. 210 Irina
Petrakova petitioned the ECtHR when authorities refused to file
charges against her partner because of the 2017 reclassification of
battery among family members as an administrative offense. 211
Lastly, in 2019, Margarita Gracheva filed suit because after
repeated attempts to get help from authorities went unanswered, her
former partner chopped her hands off, and after this, she was unable
to bring negligence claims against the inspector who refused to help
her. 212
Currently, these are considered “communicated cases.” 213 A
204 See Wuerth, supra note 188, at 298 (“[W]idespread violations of human rights law
may be a symbol of unaccountability[.]”).
205 See sources cited supra note 73.
206 See Gorbunova, supra note 7.
207 See generally Tunikova, App. No. 55974/16.
208 Id. ¶ 9.
209 Id. ¶¶ 4–5, 10.
210 Id. ¶¶ 16–19.
211 Id. ¶¶ 33–35.
212 Id. ¶¶ 45–49. Authorities decided there was no causal link between the officer’s
actions and the assault because the inspector and the assailant gave evidence the assailant
would have committed the assault regardless. Id. ¶ 49.
213 See Tunikova, App. No. 55974/16, ¶ 49; see also Antoine Buyse, Updates on
Communicated
Cases,
ECHR
BLOG
(May
12,
2010),
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communicated case means that the ECtHR has received the
application from a party making a claim against a state and wants to
give an opportunity for the state “to react.” 214 The Court sends to
the state the “application, the relevant documents, a statement of
facts made by the registry, and a series of questions and issues [] to
address.” 215 After the state reacts, the applicant can then respond. 216
While Volodina v. Russia has been adjudicated, 217 these cases are
currently awaiting a response from Russia. 218 On June 28, 2019, the
ECtHR certified three questions to the parties in each case—the
women and Russia—asking their opinion on whether (1) Russian
authorities “discharge[d] their obligation to protect the [women]
against ill treatment” in violation of the European Convention of
Human Rights; (2) the Russian government violated Article 14 of
the Convention by refusing to recognize the extent of the problem
of domestic violence and failing to take measures to protect victims;
and (3) there is an “underlying systemic problem or a structural
deficiency” in Russia to combat the issue. 219
The Volodina case included similar claims that authorities failed
to act; 220 thus, it can be inferred that Russia may face analogous
adverse rulings from the same court. But even if all the cases
pending before the ECtHR resulted in monetary damages, this alone
would be insufficient to invoke change in Russia. The ECtHR
awarded Ms. Volodina 20,000 euros in her case against Russia,
equivalent to $22,500. 221 If similar judgments were awarded in the
other cases, Russia would be paying just over $100,000, arguably
not enough to pressure the nation to institute effective reforms to
protect victims. 222
http://echrblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/updates-on-communicated-cases.html
[https://perma.cc/D878-BP53].
214 Buyse, supra note 213.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 See generally Volodina, App. No. 41261/17 (detailing the facts, relevant
international material and merits of the case).
218 See generally Tunikova, App. No. 55974/16.
219 Id. Questions to the Parties ¶ 3
220 See supra Part II.B.
221 Higgins, supra note 13.
222 Russia’s Gross Domestic Product [GDP] in 2019 was $1,689,500,000,000 and has
grown since 2017; thus, ECtHR rulings would be insufficient to effectuate change. The
BANK,
https://www.worldbank.org/
World
Bank
in
Russia,
WORLD
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3. The Pilot-Judgment Procedure
Alternatively, the ECtHR could invoke the Pilot-Judgment
Procedure against Russia to force the nation to act. 223 When the
Court must make rulings on similar cases, the ECtHR can invoke
the Pilot-Judgment Procedure to reach “determinations about a
systematic problem and instruct[] the government to adopt policy
and legal changes to prevent similar violations in the future.” 224
Thus, the ECtHR could force Russia to change its policies or face
consequences for ignoring the judiciary. 225 The most likely solution
would be to compel Russia to adopt specific legislation and a
framework for addressing domestic violence. 226 These new statutes
addressing domestic violence should criminalize domestic violence
and require public prosecution—placing the burden on the state to
initiate, investigate, and prosecute perpetrators; further, victims
should be able to be granted immediate restraining orders to be
protected from their assailants. 227 Additionally, the ECtHR could
demand domestic violence training for law enforcement, social
workers, and others who interact with victims. 228
en/country/russia/overview [https://perma.cc/UM5Z-26AN] (last visited June 19, 2020).
223 See EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., THE PILOT-JUDGMENT PROCEDURE 1 (2009),
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Pilot_judgment_procedure_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QP9Y-3ASD] (detailing how the Pilot-Judgment Procedure is a “means
of dealing with large groups of identical cases that derive from the same underlying
problem.”). For general information on the Pilot-Judgment Procedure, see generally,
DOMINIK HAIDER, PILOT-JUDGMENT PROCEDURE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (Leiden Boston 2013) (describing the procedure as a means for dealing with groups
of cases that arise out of the same underlying problem).
224 Kantack, supra note 90. According to the ECHR, using the Pilot-Judgment
Procedure can be effective where “there are a large number of applications concerning the
same problem, applicants will obtain redress more speedily if an effective remedy is
established at national level than if their cases are processed on an individual basis[.]”
EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., supra note 223, at 2.
225 See Kantack, supra note 90.
226 Id.; see Shreeves & Prpic, supra note 73 (discussing what neighboring EU nations
have done to combat domestic violence). The Volodina ruling also recommended that
Russia enact specific legislation. Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶ 132. In 2019, CEDAW
ordered that Russia “revise its legislation . . . ensuring, in particular, that all acts of gender–
based violence, including those in the family sphere, are criminalized and made punishable
by appropriate penalties and that legal instruments such as restraining orders and orders of
protection are legally available to victims[.]” S.T. v. Russia, supra note 196, ¶ 11.
227 See ADVOCS. OF HUM. RTS, supra note 76, at 6–7.
228 See id. at 7. It is also recommended that Russia take other steps including
eliminating reconciliation, ensuring thorough investigations, free legal representation to
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However, as the Pilot-Judgment Procedure has had mixed
success, it cannot be relied upon to make systemic changes in
Russia. 229 The first use of the procedure was in Poland’s “Bug
River” cases 230 which dealt with reparation of property rights after
residents were forced to abandon their properties after Poland’s
eastern border was re-drawn post-World War II. 231 It is considered
successful because the procedure resulted in Poland creating new
legislation, and establishing a system of reparations to those
displaced, thereby fixing the systemic issue. 232 But the procedure is
not always effective, evidenced by cases like Ivanov v. Ukraine, 233
which dealt with Ukraine’s failure to comply with the decision of
domestic courts regarding retirement benefits for veterans of the
nation’s military. 234 After the case went to the ECtHR, the Court,
using its powers under the Pilot-Judgment Procedure, “imposed a
deadline of one year [against Ukraine] for the implementation of
remedial measures, which it subsequently extended by six
months . . . because no settlement had been proposed in about 1,000
communicated cases” by Ukraine to settle their debts to the
veterans. 235 “[T]he Court [then] resumed the examination of the
adjourned applications” and delivered similar judgments, awarding
pecuniary damages to over 1,000 cases. 236 But because Ukraine
failed to act and award financial relief to the veterans, the ECtHR
continued reviewing further cases. 237 As of 2017, Ukraine remained
unwilling to provide financial relief with over 14,430 cases like

domestic violence victims, a national education program for the public at large, a system
for data collection of domestic violence statistics, more infrastructure including shelters
and hotlines, and cooperation with NGOs. Id.
229 See e.g. Ivanov v. Ukraine, App. No. 40450/04, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009).
230 Broniowski v. Poland, App. No. 31443/96 Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgment (2004).
231 Id. ¶¶ 10–12.
232 Execution of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, App. No.
31443/96 Eur. Ct. H.R., Final Resolution, ¶ 2 (2009); EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., supra note 223.
See generally Dilek Kurban, Forsaking Individual Justice: The Implications of the
European Court of Human Rights’ Pilot Judgment Procedure for Victims of Gross and
Systemic Violations, 16 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 731 (2016).
233 Ivanov, App. No. 40450/04.
234 Id. ¶¶ 8–20.
235 Lize R. Glas, The Functioning of the Pilot-Judgment Procedure of the European
Court of Human Rights in Practice, 34 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 41, 62 (2017).
236 Id.
237 Id.
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Ivanov’s still pending, so the Court, for the first time, placed the
cases within the purview of the Council of Europe’s Committee of
Ministers. 238 In June of 2020, more than a decade after the first
judgment against Ukraine, the Committee and Ukraine’s Ministry
of Justice met to begin discussing how Ukraine would comply with
the Court’s demands under the Pilot-Judgment Procedure. 239 The
long length of time as well as lack of clear sanctions highlight the
shortcomings of the Pilot-Judgment Procedure when countries
refuse to execute judgments of the ECtHR. 240
If the Pilot-Judgment Procedure was initiated, Russia could
follow the lead of Poland and make the requisite changes. 241
However, Russia could, alternatively, allow the adverse judgments
from the ECtHR to pile up with no consequences other than
engaging in talks with the Committee of Ministers, possibly years
later. Such delays would not help the thousands of victims who
experience violence daily. Therefore, the Pilot-Judgment Procedure
cannot be the only tool relied on for change.
4. Backlash as Pressure for Reform
As opposed to other external factors, the growing national and
international attention to domestic violence in Russia could bring
about reform. “Naming and shaming” nations for their human
rights abuses can lead to change. 242 For instance, nations that lack
238 Press Release, European Court of Human Rights, Strike-Out and Transmission to
the Committee of Ministers of More Than 12,000 Ukrainian Cases, ECHR 307 (2017)
(Oct. 12, 2017), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/app/conversion/pdf/?library=ECHR&id=0035881734-7499812&filename=Grand%20Chamber%20Judgment%20Burmych%20and%
20Others%20v.%20Ukraine%20-%20strike-out%20and%20transmission%20to%20the%
20Committee%20of%20Ministers.pdf [https://perma.cc/UKZ8-DE7F].
239 Public Discussion “Current Status of the Execution of Judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights “Yurii Nikolaevich Ivanov v. Ukraine” and “Burmych and Others
v. Ukraine,” COUNCIL EUR. (June 12, 2020), https://www.coe.int/en/web/kyiv/-/publicdiscussion-current-status-of-the-execution-of-judgments-of-the-european-court-ofhuman-rights-yurii-nikolaevich-ivanov-v-ukraine-and-burmych-an
[https://perma.cc/8UFK-TT3W].
240 See id.
241 See EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., supra note 223.
242 Cullen Hendrix & Wendy Wong, When Is the Pen Truly Mighty? Regime Type
and the Efficacy of Naming and Shaming in Curbing Human Rights Abuses, 43 BRIT. J.
POL. SCI., 651 (2013) (finding that shaming is ineffective in democracies but effective at
bringing about change in autocracies); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones:
Naming and Shaming the Human Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689, 707
(2008) (“Governments put in the global spotlight for violations often adopt better
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a free press or significant political opposition are particularly
susceptible to international shaming and are more likely to make
reforms because “international reporting has a much greater
potential to alter public perceptions of [violative] behavior[.]”243
The #MeToo movement that has sparked much dialogue regarding
harassment and violence against women worldwide 244 facilitated
the ousting of perpetrators in positions of power 245 and created
systematic reforms worldwide. 246 Activists in Russia also had their
own crusade in the spirit of #MeToo in which social media was
flooded with personal stories of domestic violence. 247 Hence, the
activism of citizens demanding accountability and redress for
human rights abuses in their nation can lead to positive change. 248
Activists have specifically labeled Russia as a nation in need of
reform. 249 In 2018, Human Rights Watch, an international group,
raised attention to Russia’s domestic violence problem when it
published the study, “I Could Kill You and No One Would Stop
Me,” highlighting the problem of domestic violence in post-Soviet

protections for political rights afterward, but they rarely stop or appear to lessen acts of
terror. Worse, terror sometimes increases after publicity.”); see also Dorothy Q. Thomas
& Michele E. Beasley, Domestic Violence as a Human Rights Issue, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 36,
48–49 (1993) (finding that international women’s rights activists can place pressure on
“international governmental and nongovernmental human rights bodies” to promote
“equal protection of the law” which then allows “domestic violence to be placed within
the context of international human rights law and practice”).
243 Hendrix & Wong, supra note 242, at 653.
244 John Feffer, #MeToo Goes Global, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. (Sept. 27, 2018),
https://ips-dc.org/metoo-goes-global/ [https://perma.cc/PZB5-6LLZ].
245 Audrey Carlsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men. Nearly Half of
Their Replacements Are Women, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html [https://perma.cc/6XX4-MU72] (last updated
Oct. 29, 2018).
246 In June 2019, the International Labor Organization adopted the Violence and
Harassment Convention which seeks to combat discrimination in the workplace including
“gender-based violence and harassment” based in part because of the #MeToo movement.
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Harassment
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INT’L
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_
CODE:C190 [https://perma.cc/D7ZD-GJAN]; see also Nisha Varia, Rewriting the Rules
on #MeToo Globally, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/
2019/04/30/rewriting-rules-metoo-globally [https://perma.cc/3QNY-86DT].
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248 See Hendrix & Wong, supra note 242, at 653.
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Russia in terms of its prevalence, brutality, and lack of redress. 250
The ECtHR in the Volodina ruling made note of this study as a
contributing factor as to why it ruled against Russia. 251 Nearly
1,000,000 people worldwide have signed a petition pushing for
Russia to create a domestic violence law. 252 Public shaming can
invoke action, and while Russia has yet to act, continued coverage
could bring about reform as Russia faces criticism from citizens,
NGOs, human rights groups, and other nations.
C. The Need for Internal Reform
For any success to occur, Russia, and not an outside judiciary or
international organization, must initiate and support the change
needed to protect its citizenry. 253 Even the ECtHR reasoned when
forming the Pilot-Judgment Procedure that systemic problems are
addressed “more speedily if an effective remedy is established at
[the] national level[.]” 254
The Russian government is averse to change and reluctant to
acknowledge that interfamilial violence permeates its society. 255
Parliament has de-criminalized domestic battery, 256 instituted
procedural obstacles for victims to seek justice, 257 and allowed
dozens of pieces of legislation seeking increased victim protection
to fail. 258 The government also refuses to keep statistics on the
issue. 259 Further, Russia prevents activism for change by limiting

Id.
Volodina, App. No. 41261/17, ¶¶ 66, 118, 122.
252 State Duma, Adopt the Domestic Violence Law in Russia, CHANGE.ORG,
https://www.change.org/p/state-duma-adopt-the-domestic-violence-law-inrussia?use_react=false [https://perma.cc/6LBW-DE28] (last visited June 15, 2020).
253 See Adams, supra note 5, at 69 (“[A] major step toward ending domestic violence
is ‘ending the law’s complicity in it.’”).
254 EUR. CT. HUM. RTS., supra note 223, at 2.
255 Consider Russian Senator Yelena Mizulina who claims that NGOs distort and
inflate statistics on domestic violence to increase their funding. Domestic Violence Bill:
Senator Says NGOs Distort Statistics in Bid for Grants, RT (Feb. 1, 2017),
http://www.rt.com/politics/375943-senator-blames-feminist-lobby-for/
[http://perma.cc/9RRH-CJDF].
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protests, 260 controlling the media, 261 and creating a hostile
environment for NGOs. 262 In October 2019, the Justice Ministry
responded to the ECtHR’s request for answers as to whether
Russia’s justice system protected victims. 263 In its response, Deputy
Minister Mikhail Galpernin criticized the claims about domestic
violence as “quite exaggerated” and labeled the complaints in the
ECtHR as an “attempt to undermine the legal mechanisms already
codified in Russia[.]” 264 Similarly, members of Parliament believe
domestic violence is a non-issue; lawmaker Yelena Mizulina who
proposed the 2017 law that de-criminalized domestic violence said
that women “don’t take offense when they see a man beat his wife”
and that “a man beating his wife is less offensive than when a
women humiliates a man.” 265
It is not just Russian leadership that is reluctant to change –
millions of citizens must also realize that protections for victims is
the right course of action. However, the potential for change is
limited as the rising conservative movement embraces violence to
keep a house in order. 266 Even a draft bill for domestic violence has
created an uproar as citizens have filed over 11,000 comments on
the bill, mostly negative. 267 A government rules with the consent of
the people, and with a populace that not only tolerates, but condones
See supra note 142.
See supra note 131.
262 See supra notes 139–141.
263 Russia’s Justice Ministry Says Claims About Domestic Violence Are Exaggerated,
and Men Are the Real Discrimination Victims, MEDUZA (Nov. 19, 2019),
https://meduza.io/en/news/2019/11/19/russia-s-justice-ministry-says-claims-aboutdomestic-violence-are-exaggerated-and-men-are-the-real-discrimination-victims
[https://perma.cc/6UH4-S34C].
264 Later in his statement, Galpernin insinuated that men are the true victims: “Even
if we assume that the majority of persons subjected to domestic violence in Russia are in
fact women (though there is no evidence to support this statement), it is logical to assume
that male victims suffer more from discrimination in such cases. They are in the minority
and they are not expected to request protection from abuse at the hands of a family
member, especially if inflicted by a member of the opposite sex.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
265 Roache, supra note 142.
266 See supra Part IV.B.ii.
267 Many comments complained not only of families being destroyed but of Western
encroachment and fear of progressive ideas like feminism and LGBTQ rights. One
commenter wrote, “We don’t need Western licentiousness and false democracy,” and another
stated, “Let LGBT activists create their own laws[.]” Comments to Draft Law on the
Prevention of Domestic Violence, supra note 16.
260
261

350

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLVI

violence, it will be hard to implement reform.
However, there is hope as global conversations regarding
gender violence have planted a seed of reform in Russian citizens
which could change the minds of conservative citizens and mobilize
the more liberal. 268 Shortly after the Volodina ruling, Twitter users
posted their stories of sexual harassment using the hashtag,
#INeedOpenness, and Instagram users did the same using the
hashtag #IDidn’tWanttoDie. 269 And when the draft bill was
released in 2019, conservatives may have signed letters and left
comments, but hundreds of other Russians rallied in Moscow in
support of the legislation and demanded further protections for
women. 270
The increased number of protests and global
conversations show that there is a strong voice pushing for reform.
As technology becomes ubiquitous and facilitates the spread of
ideas, hopefully norms in Russia will shift towards empathy towards
victims of violence.
VI. Conclusion
Russia faces a crisis leaving thousands of victims each year with
no haven for protection against domestic violence. But the
repugnant treatment of domestic violence in Russia no longer lurks
in the shadows as the last few years have seen increased global
criticism, unprecedented rulings in the EHCR and from the
CEDAW Committee, media attention, and a younger generation
demanding systemic change. Both the external and internal pressure
on Russia to establish legislation and programs to help victims could
invoke a systematic change. Whether this change comes due to
268 Social media can be a tool that contributes to empowerment and change. See
generally Noureddine Miladi, Social Media and Social Change, 25 DIG. MIDDLE E. STUD.
36 (2016). For instance, in the revolution of 2011 in Tunisia, activists were able to use
social media to mobilize online, share information, and plan in person protests and then in
person. Id. at 39–41. Further, social media allows for citizens in nations where the media
is government- controlled to fact check official stories, report the real facts and act as a
watchdog. Id. at 43–45. These spaces have become places for political debate. Id. at 45.
It can be inferred that Russian citizens can also empower and mobilize themselves through
social media. See generally REZA JAMALI, ONLINE ARAB SPRING: SOCIAL MEDIA AND
FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE (Chandos Publishing 2015).
269 Roache, supra note 142.
270 See Samantha Berkhead, Moscow Feminists Protest for Domestic Violence Re–
Criminalization, MOSCOW TIMES (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.themoscowtimes.com/
2019/11/26/moscow-feminists-protest-for-domestic-violence-re-criminalization-a68318
[https://perma.cc/C9KU-A5BS].
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mandatory rulings from the ECtHR or from internal demand from
citizens has yet to be decided. Russia’s main obstacle, however, is
the culture of acceptance in Russia that views violence as the glue
which keeps families together and strong. This belief is pervasive
and permeates the culture, preventing victims from seeking
protection and remedies. In the future, there may be hope that
victims of domestic violence, like Ms. Volodina, will be protected.
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